WT. Daniealdi – The corruption case uncovered at the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) is not simply a matter of misuse of funds by a few officials.

Behind this case, something far more important has been revealed: how a massive public welfare program can be transformed into an arena for rent-seeking by various groups with access to power.

Therefore, this scandal cannot be read simply as an individual issue. What is being exposed to the public is how the system works.

A system that allows state projects to become a source of economic and political gain for certain groups. In this context, the BGN case is not an aberration of the system, but rather a reflection of how the system works.

The Attorney General's Office's (AGO) naming of several suspects is indeed an important step in law enforcement. However, what is far more important is understanding what is actually being uncovered in this case.

What has been revealed is not only allegations of corruption, but also the mechanisms by which power can be used to access vast state resources.

The Free Nutritional Meals (MBG) program is one of the government's flagship programs, absorbing an extraordinarily large budget.

Its goals are very noble. The state wants to ensure that Indonesian children receive adequate nutrition as a foundation for future human resource development.

The history of development in Indonesia however shows that good intentions do not always result in good governance. When large budgets meet with weak oversight, the opportunity for rent-seeking practices almost always opens up.

The BGN case is a reminder that the greatest threat to public programs often comes not from the program's objectives themselves, but from parties who see them as opportunities to profit.

Welfare programs become arenas for rent-seeking

The investigation's findings so far show worrying signs.

Allegations of procurement arrangements, conflicts of interest, the appointment of partners close to decision-makers, and the practice of buying and selling kitchen locations within Nutrition Fulfillment Service Units (SPPG) indicate that some parties view this program as more than just a public service instrument.

A program that should be oriented toward meeting the nutritional needs of Indonesian children is instead potentially being treated as an economic and political commodity.

The project's enormous value has led various interest groups to compete for access to its implementation.

Herein lies the real problem. When public welfare projects become objects of competition between various interest groups, the orientation of public services slowly shifts to one of profit.

The consequence is that program quality is no longer the primary priority. What matters more is who gains access and who receives a share of the project.

In such a situation, the good intentions underlying these programs can easily be suspected of being instruments used to legitimise the interests of certain groups.

Welfare programs continue to operate, and the public continues to see their benefits. However, at the same time, behind the scenes, a struggle for vast amounts of state resources is taking place.

This phenomenon is nothing new in Indonesian politics. Various development projects, social assistance programs and national strategic programs in the past have demonstrated a similar pattern.

When oversight fails to keep pace with the size of the budget, state projects often become profitable rent-seeking opportunities for those close to the centre of power.

Therefore, the main issue in the MBG case is not simply the legal violations committed by certain individuals. The more fundamental question is why the established governance system allows such practices to flourish.

Oligarchy living off state budget

Public concern has grown following the emergence of a list of dozens of names allegedly holding interests in the program's implementation.

Regardless of the veracity of the list, which must be proven through legal proceedings, its emergence provides a glimpse into the broad spectrum of power allegedly connected to the MBG project.

The names mentioned come from various backgrounds. They include elements of political parties, the bureaucracy, state institutions and even groups wielding influence in national political life.

If these allegations are proven, then what is being faced is no longer simply administrative corruption, but rather the practice of using political influence to gain access to state resources.

This is where the term oligarchy becomes relevant. Oligarchies do not always exist in the form of a handful of conglomerates which directly control the government.

In practice, oligarchies operate through a network of interconnected and mutually beneficial interests.

They can come from various institutions, but share a common interest, namely maintaining access to economic and political resources.

The MBG case illustrates how such a network can potentially operate. The state provides the budget. Power provides access. Various groups then compete to gain positions that allow them to share in the flow of resources.

In political science, this pattern is known as a rentier oligarchy. Political power is used to gain economic benefits, while economic benefits are then used to strengthen political positions.

This cycle repeats itself, resulting in the concentration of power in certain groups.

The most dangerous aspect of this situation is when this practice is considered normal. The public becomes accustomed to seeing state projects shared out based on political proximity.

Corruption is no longer seen as an aberration, but rather as an inevitable consequence of power.

If such conditions are allowed to persist, the state will gradually lose its function as a servant of the public interest. The state will become an arena for distributing profits to groups with the closest access to the centre of power.

Saving the MBG from the grip of the oligarchy

The greatest loss in this case is not just the potential loss of state funds. A far more serious impact is the erosion of public trust in the state and government institutions.

The public does of course understand that every major program carries the risk of irregularities. However, what is difficult to accept is when a program designed from the outset as a state flagship project, with a budget allocation reaching hundreds of trillions of rupiah, is actually running without an adequate, transparent oversight system and without credible governance. This is where the core problem lies.

The BGN case ultimately gives rise to an unavoidable question: How could a program with such a large budget be launched without a control mechanism capable of anticipating the potential rent-seeking that would inevitably surround it?

In the study of public policy, the larger the budget managed, the stronger the oversight system must be.

The MBG case however is quite the opposite. The state appears to be overly confident that the program's good intentions will be enough to prevent irregularities.

Yet decades of Indonesian experience have shown that any state project managing large funds has always been a magnet for various interest groups.

This risk is neither new nor difficult to predict.

Therefore, when the government continues to implement a massive program without establishing strong institutional safeguards, the public has the right to question the motives behind the planning and governance that accompany it.

It is on this point that President Prabowo Subianto's political accountability becomes relevant to discuss. The President holds the highest authority, initiating, promoting and making the MBG one of the main symbols of his administration.

Under a democratic system, the success of a program is indeed a political achievement for the president. However, by the same logic, the failure of its oversight design cannot be separated from the president's political accountability.

The question becomes simple: Why is the government so bold as to disburse such a large sum of public funds, yet fail to establish an oversight system with the capacity, independence, and credibility commensurate with the size of the budget?

When this question does not receive an adequate response, it appears that the state has issued a blank cheque that can be cashed in by anyone with access to the circles of power.

Therefore, the resolution of this case must not stop at naming a few suspects. If only the implementers in the field are touched, while policy design and the broader network of interests are never examined, then all that occurs is a change of actors without systemic change.

The public has the right to know who benefits, how the project distribution mechanism works, who provides recommendations, and how various parties can gain access to the program.

In this context, the House of Representatives (DPR), as the people's representative with legislative, budgetary and oversight duties, also needs be questioned. They cannot just perform routine oversight functions.

The scale of the budget and the broad spectrum of parties named as involved in this case are worthy of a more serious political investigation.

The right of interpellation or the formation of a special committee could be constitutional instruments to uncover the problem more thoroughly.

Indonesia has used similar mechanisms in various major cases deemed to be of public interest.

If hundreds of trillions of rupiah of state funds are at stake in a program that is a government icon, then extraordinary oversight is also something that is normal.

Moreover, the case development process must be conducted openly and transparently. The public should not simply be presented with a list of suspects, but also be given a complete picture of how the system operates.

Who was involved, who benefited and who was responsible for the failure of oversight must be clearly explained to the public. Only then can public trust be restored.

The MBG program is truly too important to fail. This program has a grandiose humanitarian narrative. We must not allow this grandiose narrative to become a cover for the malicious manipulation by irresponsible parties.

The future of millions of Indonesian children must not be sacrificed by weak governance or by vested interests that use the state budget (APBN) as a source of political rents.

Precisely because this program is good and important, its entire implementation process must be open to public scrutiny.

If the government truly wants to use this case as a momentum for improvement, it must expose not only the legal violations but also the policy design that allows them to occur.

Because in a democratic country, the most dangerous corruption is not corruption that is carried out secretly.

The most dangerous corruption is when the state, through negligence or weak governance, unknowingly, let alone deliberately, gives a blank check to the oligarchy to access and control public resources.

That is the most valuable lesson being demonstrated by the MBG case today.

[WT. Daniealdi is a lecturer in international relations at the Indonesian Computer University (UNIKOM) Faculty of Social and Political Sciences in Bandung, and an observer of politics, defence, security and international relations. Translated by James Balowski. The original title of the article was "MBG: Cek Kosong Negara untuk Oligarki".]

Source: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/06/27/14575381/mbg-cek-kosong-negara-untuk-oligarki